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AIR UNIVERSITY
AIR WAR COLLEGE
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE
ALABAMA

ESN/jcf

30 July 1951

AN AIR WAR COLLEGE STAFF STUDY

SUBJECT: An Analysis of the Bارسوس Report

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

1. To analyze the findings of the Bارسوس Report and from that analysis to submit pertinent recommendations for the guidance of the Air Force.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. The subject study was directed by letter from Headquarters, USAF, attached as Inclosure #1 (Tab A).

3. The period covered by the study analyzed is from 25 June 1950 through 31 December 1950.

ASSUMPTIONS

4. Personnel participating in the compilation of the subject report by virtue of previous experience were qualified to appraise and evaluate tactical air operations.

5. The inquiry of the Bارسوس group was sufficiently exhaustive and included a cross section sufficiently large to permit an accurate determination and evaluation of the factors affecting USAF effectiveness.

CONCLUSIONS

6. This report reflects extensive inquiry and diligent effort on the part of the authors.

7. The report has value for both command and school use within the Air Force.

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8. The acceptance of conditions in the Far East Theater as being normal and, therefore, as a sole basis for valid concepts for the employment of air power is viewed as unsound and highly dangerous.

9. There exists a definite need for a comparison of the lessons learned from the Korean war and their relationships, with employment of air power in future wars.

10. There is a need, in some cases urgent, for the solution of the problems outlined in this report.

11. The following are the major problems that are pointed out in the Barcus report as having hindered the effectiveness of the Air Force in Korea. Obviously, all of the numerous problems normally encountered in a theater of operations have not been defined in this staff study. Some of the problems defined cannot be resolved within the Air Force while others are within the scope of Air Force responsibility and authority.

Resolution Lies Outside the Air Force

a. Doctrine.

- (1) Dissemination to commanders of the other two services, and within these services, of established inter-service responsibilities, functions, and relationships, and the obtaining of acceptance of these functions, responsibilities and relationships in fact and in spirit by the Army and the Navy.

Resolution Lies Within the Air Force

b. Doctrine.

- (1) The need for the formulation of current Air Force doctrine and for the dissemination of this doctrine within the Air Force as well as to other services is indicated.
- (2) In the Korean theater various Air Force weapons were used in roles for which they were not designed and in which, according to previously established doctrine, their greatest potential was not exploited. Examination of these roles with the view of determining the desirability of their inclusion in Air Force doctrine is suggested.

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c. Organization

- (1) Aviation engineering services for the construction of airfields in Korea was inadequate.
- (2) Units for the handling of cargo at air terminals in the Zone of Operations failed to provide adequate personnel for the prompt handling of air cargo.
- (3) The placing of the reconnaissance staff function in FEAF Headquarters under the Deputy for Intelligence is a departure from Air Force doctrine that affected the utilization of the reconnaissance capability in the theater.
- (4) Difficulties resulting from the failure of all the functions of aerial ports to come within Air Force responsibility were encountered.
- (5) The Air Depot Wing Organization does not provide an air transport squadron needed for them to give prompt and efficient service to Air Force units.
- (6) The movement of tactical squadrons of the Wing Base Organization forward without their supporting elements resulted in confusion and reduced effectiveness.

d. Personnel and Training.

- (1) Personnel shortages were particularly acute in the following category: Armament, intelligence, communication, engineering units, and personnel for the construction of base storage.
- (2) The lack of uniformity, within the theater, of personnel policies for promotion and rotation produced an adverse effect on the morale of theater personnel and failed to make Air Force wide use of combat experience.
- (3) Personnel shortages were made more acute by the inadequate training that had been given to the personnel available.
- (4) Morale was affected adversely by the failure to provide for the continued identity of service units that were transferred into Korea.

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e. Tactical Air Control System

- (1) The Tactical Air Control System lacked integrated control and supervision.
- (2) The communications system within Fifth Air Force was unable to provide the volume of service, and the security for that service, that was required for operational use in the Korean war.
- (3) The air-to-ground communications system was unsatisfactory and failed to provide the communications needed for the effective utilization of aircraft employed in the close air attack role.
- (4) The Tactical Air Control System, although hindered by the absence of an Air-Ground Operations System, was generally less effective than was desirable.

f. Reconnaissance

- (1) In comparison with the Italian Theater in World War II, an area of similar size, the reconnaissance capability available to the Far East Theater was out of balance with the tactical and strategic effort employed.
- (2) The number of reconnaissance aircraft available to the theater were hopelessly inadequate, particularly for the interdiction program conducted.
- (3) Adequate ground intelligence was not available to reconnaissance units.
- (4) Reconnaissance staff work was not all that was to be desired.

g. Research and Development

- (1) There is a definite need for the development of new weapons particularly for anti-personnel weapons.
- (2) The requirement for further research and development in the use of napalm and rockets was defined.
- (3) The requirement for a capability to engage in all types of activities during day or night, regardless of weather, is again emphasized by the Korean war as it was in World War II.

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- (4) There is a requirement for a means of more accurately marking the bomb line.
- (5) The development of the capability for effective night operations including the capability of attacking an enemy dispersed and moving at night was emphasized as a requirement.
- (6) Research into the employment of psychological warfare was cited as a field for profitable exploitation.
- (7) The development of a suitable vehicle for use by TACPs, adequate for communications, and possessing suitable mobility and durability, was a requirement described as necessary for effective tactical air control operations.

B. Operations

- (1) The tactical air control system lacked effective coordination.
- (2) The effectiveness of theater staff operations was impaired by repeated request for voluminous reports and information from agencies outside the theater.
- (3) TADCs were not utilized in the Tactical Air Control System.
- (4) TACPs were needlessly exposed in the front lines.
- (5) Reconnaissance information was improperly routed.
- (6) The Intelligence Staff was given the function of statistical reporting.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. That this report be used by the Air Force to give emphasis to the need for the dissemination to commanders of the other two services and within these services of established inter-service responsibilities, functions, and relationships, and the obtaining of acceptance of these responsibilities, functions, and relationships, in fact and in spirit, by both the Army and the Navy.

13. That priority be given to the formulation of current Air Force doctrine, particularly doctrine pertaining to the employment of air forces in a theater of operations, and the dissemination of this doctrine throughout the Air Force and the other two services.

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14. That, with the exception of those portions of the report revealing disagreement among top commanders and reflecting inter-service controversies, this report be distributed to each of the major commands for their information and appropriate action.

DISCUSSION**15. Doctrine (Theater of Operations)**

a. In spite of the limitations imposed by an organizational structure orientated on a ground force point of view, the Air Force has played a major role in waging war against the communist forces in Korea. The full exploitation of air power in Korea was seriously hindered by the command and organization in the Far East Theater. It is evident that the organization of the Far East Theater was not in accordance with the principles of unified command as laid down by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Theater Staff was in no sense a Joint Staff with equal representation of the three services. "Coordination Control" implemented by a GCHQ directive established the basic theater policy that was to provide the coordination of effort of the three service components. It was evident that this method of control was a weak substitute for the type of control envisaged in the JCS directive. The result was to the detriment of the USAF effectiveness in Korea. Command decisions were made by ground commanders who should not have been permitted to make decisions on air matters. Ground commanders selected targets for air attacks, assigned priority of tasks, and were even given operational control of Air Forces.

Ground commanders, including those at top levels, demonstrated a lack of understanding of the essential principles of air power employment, especially of the Air Force task of maintaining air superiority and of carrying out interdiction operations. They failed to demonstrate a working knowledge of the principles of air power employment in conjunction with ground forces as derived in their FM 31-35. GCHQ, in particular, indicated a lack of appreciation of the effect that could be produced from the application of air effort to a system of interdiction targets. The failure of GCHQ and ground component commanders to include air representatives in over-all planning resulted in operational confusion and ineffectiveness.

b. The Army demonstrated that they were not prepared to meet their obligation to provide an Air-Ground Operations System as delineated in FM 31-35. They failed to provide a Photo Reproduction Center, an Army Photo Interpreter, an Air-Ground Liaison Signal Company, and a G-2, G-3 Air Net, all of which were necessary for the most effective employment of the air effort in the theater. The Air Forces were forced to provide equipment and personnel to do the Army's job in the air-ground system. The result was that air effort was not employed in a manner consistent with sound Air Force doctrine. In some cases it was used to relieve a local emergency or to alleviate a logistical crisis created by poor planning.

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c. With unlimited freedom to conduct air cargo transport operations ground commanders leaned more and more on air transportation to provide logistical support. Airlift capability was expended to a dangerously low level.

d. Many of the difficulties encountered in close air attack operations can be traced to the widespread unfamiliarity of ground commanders with doctrine of close air attack in conjunction with ground forces, also a profound lack of knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of military aviation. This led to an unrealistic dependence on air power and to demands that were impossible of achievement.

e. Thus is underlined the urgent necessity for the definition and dissemination of the functions, responsibilities, and relationships of each of the three services in a theater of operations and for obtaining the acceptance of these functions, responsibilities, and relationships in spirit and in fact by the commanders of all the services. This is vital to the national interest and should be viewed as a lesson fortunately learned in a campaign that was not decisive.

16. Doctrine (Air Force).

a. The use of WD FM 31-35, dated August 1946, as a guide for evaluating the effectiveness of USAF effort in Korea emphasizes the absence of an adequate Air Force statement of doctrine on which to base Air Force plans, policies, and tactics. The imperative need for the formulation and dissemination of such doctrine within the Air Force and the other services appears to be clearly underlined in this report. Particularly does it appear that the role of Air Forces in theater operations is in need of definition. Air Force personnel have demonstrated a lack of knowledge of the principles of air power employment in a theater of operations.

b. The lack of preparation for the war and the necessity for meeting the emergency with what there was available is not forgotten. It seems, however, that Air Force commanders were unable to make known to top theater and service commanders the difficulties that would be encountered as a result of the employment of Air Forces not properly balanced. The amount of reconnaissance effort, for example, available for employment in the Far East Theater was not in balance with the forces employed. The principle that Air Forces can be economically employed only when supported by adequate reconnaissance did not appear to have been effectively promulgated among or taken cognizance of by the higher levels of command.

c. The absence of effective enemy air opposition in the theater, the nature of the theater command organization, the critical ground battle, and the sudden thrusting of a tactical mission upon

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non-tactical Air Forces are believed to have produced factors that resulted in the employment of Air Forces in the Korean war in roles that are peculiar to this war. It is believed that some of the uses to which air capabilities have been put have not been generally a part of Air Force doctrine. Some of these uses have been sanctioned by the authors of the Barons report, and have even been suggested as a field for further exploitation. The Barons evaluators have given approbation to the employment of B-29 medium bomber aircraft in the tactical role of carpet bombing under conditions not believed to be within the scope of current air force doctrine. Air Force doctrine in regard to the employment of air capability on carpet bombing assignments dictates; first, that the target area be of suitable size for attack by the forces available; second, that this type of attack be capitalized upon by an immediate and vigorously executed offensive by the ground forces. Unless these prerequisites are met or a general emergency exists, wherein the success of the theater mission will be determined, the employment of Air Forces in this role is not considered to be justified. Local emergencies are not situations that warrant this use of air effort.

d. The B-37 aircraft was described as possessing a promising night intruder capability. Its ability to roam over wide areas, dropping bombs at widely separated points was defined as an effective means of harassing enemy ground troops and creating a disquieting fear during the night that would reduce their daytime combat effectiveness. The employment of this Air Force weapon in this role is not believed to have been previously included in Air Force doctrine.

e. Theater Air Forces were directed to conduct experimental studies on the use of air force weapons assigned for operational use in the theater. This appears to be a use to which weapons in a theater of operations are not normally assigned. The information sought may have been available from the Zone of Interior.

f. The employment of C-47 type aircraft on flare dropping missions was described as promising. This use of this type aircraft suggests the caution against the acceptance of this role as normal or of its being suitable under normal conditions.

g. The Air Force doctrine of interdiction is questioned in the Barons report. The report states that the premise that the enemy is mechanized, a premise on which Air Force doctrine is based, has been proved invalid by the Korean war and that our interdiction concept is too narrow. The enemy's success in moving at night, on foot, emphasizes that against this type of movement an interdiction program must include attacks on personnel moving into the battle area under cover of darkness.

h. The two following statements of concepts of air power employment are quoted from the report being analyzed:

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"It is pertinent to point out that the medium bomber appears to be susceptible of much greater flexibility of employment than is contemplated in current Air Force doctrine or than was shown in its use in the Korean war."

"Once the major problem -- carrying out interdiction to include stopping of movement on other than normal lines of transportation and communication -- has been solved, certain other minor problems of interdiction operations will be susceptible to easy solution. Perhaps, the most important of these is to establish the principle that in future wars, aircraft available to do a job must be used on that job despite the fact that the aircraft might not have been designed or its crew previously trained to do the job."

These concepts are consistent with Air Force doctrine, provided the weapon employed is not hindered in the performance of its primary function. This principle should be stated clearly in Air Force doctrine.

i. The employment of B-29 aircraft justified on the basis of the morale effect produced on ground troops is inconsistent with Air Force doctrine heretofore accepted. If the employment of air capability in this role was not considered to have determined the success or failure of the theater mission, it is believed that current Air Force doctrine does not include this concept.

j. The authors reference to the general lack of understanding at all Air Force levels of the capabilities, limitations, and operational techniques of reconnaissance aviation was noted. This inadequacy suggests the need for the dissemination of Air Force doctrine within the Air Force.

k. The exhaustion of air transportation capabilities within the theater to a point inconsistent with emergency use was brought out in this report. This expenditure of air capability appears to have been incompatible with generally accepted Air Force concepts of the use of theater air lift.

17. Organization

a. Aviation engineering services for the construction of vitally needed airfields in Korea were inadequate. They lacked properly trained personnel and proper equipment.

b. In the Far East Theater the manning and equipping of these units were responsibilities of the Army. The Barcus report does not place the blame for inadequacies of personnel in these units solely upon the Army. They do strongly recommend that the Air Force take over complete

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responsibility for all aviation engineering battalions. It is clearly indicated that a problem exists and that its resolution may lie within the field of organization.

c. The complete dependence upon the Army Transportation Corps personnel for loading and unloading cargo at all air terminals in the Zone of Operations resulted in an undesirable situation. Personnel to handle cargoes were insufficient in number resulting in the necessity for crew members handling the cargo themselves.

d. The need for examination of the tactical control system with a view of establishing a clear-cut and definite chain of command from the Air Force Commander to the Air Control Group to the Control Squadron Commander is indicated.

e. The location of the reconnaissance staff function under the Deputy for Intelligence at FEAF Headquarters was noted as being a departure from Air Force doctrine and in contradiction to the experience gained during World War II. The author of the Barcus Report thought this staff was below the desired standard of effectiveness. They observed that it was needlessly over-staffed.

f. The Wing Base Organization was described as inadequate and the cause of one of the major logistical problems encountered. Experience in Korea was offered as evidence that confusion is the immediate result of the tactical squadrons of a Wing-Base being moved long distances without their supporting elements accompanying them.

18. Personnel and Training

a. Shortage of competent armament personnel was listed as one of the principle causes of the limited effectiveness of some Air Force weapons and munitions. In spite of an earnest effort on the part of this limited personnel, there was not adequate rearmament service and maintenance for guns, sights, etc. Re-equipping units with F-51 aircraft added to the burden. Personnel arriving in the theater to augment under-strength units lacked experience in their specialties.

b. In order that the Intelligence Section of Bomber Command might be properly staffed, personnel had to be drawn from the groups in that command and from the Fifteenth Air Force. As a result, many of the personnel finally performing intelligence functions within Bomber Command, below headquarters level, had no formal intelligence training. The assignment of additional duties to Fifth Air Force Intelligence personnel demonstrated that there was a lack of trained officers within the theater and that there had been a lack of emphasis on intelligence assignments. The outbreak of the war had created an immediate shortage of Intelligence personnel and personnel had to be drafted for this function who had no training, particularly in briefing and interrogation.

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The failure to maintain within tactical units intelligence personnel sufficient in number and training to meet combat operational needs of those units was sighted as a basic source of the failure of the intelligence mission to measure up to the necessary and desired standard. Air Force TO policies failed to provide primary duty Intelligence Officers at squadron level and provided only one at group level. This provision was inadequate.

c. Air Force communications units suffered seriously from the lack of experienced people to operate VHF and FM equipment. Although the arrival into the theater of supplementary personnel alleviated the situation to some degree, the problem was by no means resolved. Cryptographic personnel are in short supply.

d. In the Far East Theater the manning of aviation engineering units was an Army responsibility, but the authors believed that Air Force too was responsible for the shortage of properly trained personnel for the construction of airfields. They strongly recommended that the Air Force take over complete responsibility for engineering aviation battalions.

e. Hasty effort at Air Force bases in Korea was charged to the lack of qualified personnel to construct base storage with the result that the use of drum steel was necessary.

f. The lack of firm and uniform rotation policies within the theater resulted in the lowering of the morale of combat crews. The problem of replacements precluded an easy and ready solution. The lack of suitable rotation policies failed to provide for the spreading of combat experience throughout the Air Force.

g. The existence of different promotion policies in the major components of FEAF had a detrimental effect on morale. The need for the immediate adoption of a standardized promotion policy carefully correlated with that of the Zone of the Interior was underlined.

h. When the exigencies of war suddenly demand that tactical and supporting units be detached from their parent units and moved to distant locations, units whose personnel had trained together were not kept intact. It is believed that the preservation of unit identity is of considerable value.

19. Tactical Air Control System.

a. Tactical Air Control System lacked the integration and flexibility that had been demonstrated by World War II experience to be essential to effective air operations. Experience in Europe underlined the necessity for having integrated control of the air capability

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employed in conjunction with ground forces in the immediate battle areas, and accentuated the need for delegating control to subordinate units while at the same time providing integration of all control activities through the TACC. The absence of TADCs to which control could be passed and through which the control load could be smoothly and evenly distributed to TACPs resulted in over-centralization of control at the TACC and in a saturation of the TACPs by control tasks passed directly to them from the TACC. Had TADCs been established and properly used, there would have been adequate integration of control by the TACC with a proper delegation of control assignments to subordinate units without overloading at either the top or the bottom of the system. The use of airborne controllers to fill the gap left by the absence of TADCs was a partial but inadequate solution to the problem involved.

b. Staff coordination and support left much to be desired. Internal disagreement at Fifth Air Force as to staff responsibilities created a situation that resulted in a lack of SOPs that were needed to standardize the operating procedures used by the various elements of the system. The result was that these elements operated with a minimum of supervision and failed to use standard procedures thereby reducing the operational effectiveness. The Barcus group did report, however, that these staff problems being resolved before their study had ended.

c. Communications on which a tactical control system is dependent were inadequate. They failed to meet the minimum requirements as to quantity and security. The equipment available was that used in World War II and was not suitable for use in the rugged Korean terrain. Control units had insufficient transportation, therefore lacked the mobility absolutely essential in a fluid ground situation. Equipment lacked durability and was frequently out of order before it was put into use. Communications personnel were not qualified to perform the highly technical maintenance that was required for operation of the equipment and in some cases they were only vaguely familiar with the operation of the equipment when it was in repair.

d. The failure to integrate the Marine air effort into the Air Force tactical air operations contradicted accepted doctrine of air power employment and created problems of control that resulted in some cases in abortive effort. It was clearly demonstrated that all air forces in a theater must be employed in a single integrated effort under the command of the theater air component commander.

e. The use of only four VHF channels by all TACPs as well as two F-51 groups resulted in extreme crowding and the frequent use of the channel reserved for emergency use, in the early weeks of the war. The number of channels was later increased. This required the use of all VHF equipment, and resulted in frequent interference and feedback difficulties.

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f. The inadequacy of the Air-Ground Operations System - the absence of Army Photo Interpreter, a Reproduction Center, and a Signal Company, Air-Ground Liaison - did not permit the full exploitation of the Air Force aid to the Army.

20. Reconnaissance

a. The authors have evaluated the effectiveness of the reconnaissance effort in the Far East Theater as being satisfactory. However, from the numerous deficiencies that are enumerated and the text discussion that follows this assessment, it is concluded that the reconnaissance requirement for the theater was not met. Their statement that the amount of intelligence produced from the reconnaissance effort, and that the speed with which this intelligence was disseminated was disappointing in comparison with World War II standards gives substantiation to this interpretation.

b. A comparison of the reconnaissance capability assigned to the Korean theater with that employed in Italy, a comparable area during World War II, will disclose that this capability was not in balance with the tactical and strategic effort employed. Three reconnaissance squadrons were given the task of supplying the visual and photo reconnaissance for the Air Force and Ground Forces in Korea. In Italy there was double this number of squadrons available to perform these functions. The one strategic reconnaissance squadron assigned to provide reconnaissance coverage for Bomber Command adequately met their requirement in Korea so long as the B-29 effort was directed against strategic targets. When this effort was applied to interdiction targets this squadron was completely incapable of supplying the reconnaissance coverage needed for the successful prosecution of the campaign.

c. Tactical reconnaissance in the theater was confronted with the problem of supplying information to the ground forces and at the same time meeting the day-to-day requirements of their own tactical forces. Because of a lack of personnel and facilities in the ground forces for utilizing intelligence obtained from air reconnaissance, there were abnormally few requests for reconnaissance coverage. Had ground armies been prepared to make use of air reconnaissance coverage to the degree envisioned in currently accepted doctrine, tactical reconnaissance units would have been unable to supply the intelligence requested. Aircraft shortages forced the use of single aircraft on reconnaissance missions, a use which is inconsistent with previous experience.

d. The interchange of intelligence between ground and air forces necessary for effective reconnaissance operations was not realized. Photo interpreters lacked the intelligence necessary to make the interpretations they were required to make. Some technical operational difficulties were encountered, but these appeared to present no problems of a

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fundamental nature.

e. Reconnaissance staff work in the theater was criticized as being ineffective. This, it was said, was due in part to a lack of understanding on the part of Staff Officers, including those at Fifth Air Force, Bomber Command, and FFAF of the capabilities and limitations of reconnaissance aviation. At FFAF the reconnaissance staff being located in the Office of the Deputy for Intelligence did not make for good results. The section was over-staffed and in particular was criticized for the misuse of badly needed photo interpreters.

f. Mapping assignment absorbed much of the reconnaissance effort available to the theater.

g. Technical difficulties encountered in the employment of tactical reconnaissance units and poor communications from point to point on the ground nullified a great portion of the effort expended.

21. Research and Development

a. The fact that there was only one weapon, the 6 1/2" rocket, used in the Korean war that was not used in World War II emphasizes the general need for the development of new weapons. A re-evaluation of our whole weapons system with emphasis on the requirement for anti-personnel weapons is dictated. Napalm is most effective when dropped from low altitudes and as it will be difficult to drop from a low altitude in heavily defended areas, some device should be developed for its effective use from high altitudes.

b. Aircraft capability of carrying out night interdiction missions, anti-personnel attacks, and effecting harassing attacks was urgently needed in Korea. In the face of day air attacks, any enemy will resort to night movement of troops, weapons, and logistics.

c. The location of the bomb line in the Korean war was often unrealistic. This fault may have been due to poor air-ground coordination. It is believed that a means of more accurately identifying the bomb line from the air would give confidence to ground troops and commanders and permit more effective close support.

d. The development of the capability for night operations to be employed in either offensive or defensive roles is described as a requirement. This requirement includes the techniques and means for the use of this capability.

e. More extensive use of psychological warfare should be made. The minimum requirement should be at least an effort capable of



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offsetting enemy propaganda. In the Korean war we did not counter enemy propaganda that described our Air Force as barbaric war makers bent upon attacking civilians in areas of no military significance. The communist so thoroughly sold this idea that no small effort would be required to offset it. This oversight may have been in part an administrative one. The authors have stated that alert State Department representatives in the areas of action would have resulted in alleviation of this condition. The case was that the State Department relied upon ground commanders for their information. Much unfavorable psychological effect was produced among the non-communist nations elsewhere in the world.

22. Operations

a. Many of the operational problems that handicapped the efficiency of air units in Korea came from having a war mission suddenly thrust upon them. Personnel and equipment shortages produced and magnified a multiplicity of operational problems. Vitally needed operational units were late arriving in Korea, and after arriving were slow in reaching the desired degree of proficiency. Some of the problems encountered are fundamental and could not be resolved at operations level. They have been mentioned elsewhere in this staff study. The activities of the various components of the Tactical Air Control System were not effectively coordinated. The system became too unwieldy for supervision by the Deputy for Operations. Information needed as a basis for rendering decisions was frequently lacking at the decision making echelon. Had all the activities of the control system been integrated and coordinated, increased effectiveness would have resulted.

b. The system for the employment of air effort in conjunction with ground force employment is highly complex and requires close coordination and the most efficient handling. The by-passing of the TADCs in the air control organization resulted in wasted air effort because of the lack of control facilities available to tactical aircraft airborne in the battle area.

c. TACP units operating with ground forces in their enthusiasm for providing effective close air attack were needlessly exposed and expended. They finally had to be withdrawn from the more advanced front line positions. There is a need for the proper protection of these units.

d. Air Force doctrine dictates that the Tactical Reconnaissance Wing be located adjacent to the Air Force Headquarters it serves, and that the reconnaissance information be passed directly to that headquarters. The 543rd Reconnaissance Group occupied the airdrome of the 6194th Tactical Support Wing. Orders from Fifth Air Force and Intelligence for Fifth Air Force passed through the Headquarters facilities of the 6194th Tactical

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Support Ring. The result was delay and ineffective use of some reconnaissance information.

g. Well established doctrine has stated that statistical reporting is a function of the Comptroller and that reporting the results of our own operations is a function of the Operations Section, and that reporting information on the enemy is a function of Intelligence. Within Fifth Air Force, Intelligence had all three functions to the greater detriment of its legitimate job of reporting information on the enemy.

I Incl

Ltr directive (Tab A)


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